We are interested in the following version of Jeffreys's law: if two predictors are predicting the same sequence of events and either is doing a satisfactory job, they will make similar predictions in the long run. We give a classification of instances of Jeffreys's law, illustrated with examples.
Introduction
In this paper we are interested in games of prediction for which Jeffreys's law, as stated in the abstract, holds. Specific true instances of Jeffreys's law will be referred to as Jeffreys theorems.
In Section 2 we define several popular games of prediction and state Jeffreys theorems for the absolute-loss, square-loss, and bounded square-loss games. These results serve as illustrations for our taxonomy of Jeffreys theorems; namely, we distinguish between Jeffreys theorems of level 1 (weakest), level 2 (intermediate), and level 3 (strongest).
In Section 3 we show that in the case of so-called perfectly mixable games there is no difference between the three levels of Jeffreys theorems. Perfectly mixable games include, in particular, log-loss games and the bounded squareloss game.
In the next section, Section 4, we state level 2 Jeffreys theorems, which cover the log-loss and square-loss games (not necessarily bounded). In combination with the results of Section 3 this provides us with examples of level 3 Jeffreys theorems. Some of the results in Section 4 are explicit inequalities, not just statements of convergence.
The simple method of Section 4 does not work for the absolute-loss game. In Section 5 we will see that it is still possible to prove a Jeffreys theorem for this game, albeit only a level 1 one.
Perhaps the first instance of Jeffreys's law was proved by Blackwell and Dubins [2] ; a pointwise version of their result was established in [3] . Results similar to ours but stated in terms of the algorithmic theory of randomness were earlier obtained in [9] (developing [6] ) and [5] in the case of the log-loss game, and in [11] (in essence developing [8] ) in the case of the bounded squareloss game.
Taxonomy and examples of Jeffreys theorems
A game of prediction is a triple (Ω, Γ, ℓ), where Ω and Γ are arbitrary sets, called the outcome space and prediction space, respectively, and ℓ : Ω × Γ → R is called the loss function. The game is played according to the following perfectinformation protocol.
Competitive prediction protocol Players: Nature, Predictor 1, Predictor 2, Sceptic Protocol:
Predictor 1 and Predictor 2 announce γ [1] n ∈ Γ and γ [2] n ∈ Γ. Sceptic announcesγ n ∈ Γ. Nature announces ω n ∈ Ω. END FOR Three of the players, two Predictors and one Sceptic, are trying to predict the outcome ω n to be announced by Nature. Sceptic is just like another Predictor, but he will be playing a special role in our story. At step n, Predictor 1 and Predictor 2 issue predictions γ [1] n and γ [2] n , respectively. The Predictors can consult each other when making the predictions, and the pair (γ [1] n , γ [2] n ) can be regarded as their joint prediction. After the two Predictors have announced, Sceptic issues his own predictionγ n . Then Nature produces ω n . Let L 
n ) be the cumulative loss to time N of Predictor k, k = 1, 2, and similarlyL N for Sceptic.
The absolute-loss game is (R, R, ℓ) where ℓ(ω, γ) := |ω − γ|. The next proposition states our first Jeffreys theorem. Proposition 1. Sceptic has a strategy in the absolute-loss game that guarantees
As usual, we set 1/0 := ∞ in (1). For the proof of Proposition 1, see Section 5. We call (1), perhaps with |γ
N | replaced by a different distance, a level 1 Jeffreys theorem. It says that for a sufficiently distant outcome ω N , N ≫ 1, at least one of the following three things happen: the two Predictors' predictions γ [1] N and γ [2] N are close to each other; Sceptic greatly outperforms Predictor 1 by time N ; Sceptic greatly outperforms Predictor 2 by time N . The weakness of this statement is that no "stabilization" is guaranteed along a given infinite sequence of outcomes ω 1 ω 2 . . .: it is possible that each one of the three terms of the disjunction will be violated infinitely often.
A stronger Jeffreys theorem, which we call a level 2 Jeffreys theorem, would say that
An even stronger statement, which we call a level 3 Jeffreys theorem, would be Proposition 2. Sceptic has a strategy in the square-loss game that guarantees (2).
The bounded square-loss game is
(We fix specific bounds, 0 and 1, for outcomes and predictions, but our results generalize in a straightforward manner to any other bounds.) Proposition 3. Sceptic has a strategy in the bounded square-loss game that guarantees (3). Proposition 2 will be proved in Section 4, and it will imply Proposition 3 in combination with results of Section 3.
Counterexample
The bounded absolute-loss game is ( Proof. Suppose Sceptic has such a strategy and is playing it. Let Nature produce 0 and 1 independently with probability 1/2 each. Predictor 1 always predicts 0 and Predictor 2 always predicts 1. The restriction of Sceptic's strategy to ω n ∈ {0, 1} and γ [1] n , γ [2] n ∈ {0, 1} is automatically measurable. We can see that L [1] n −L n and L [2] n −L n are martingales with bounded increments, and so tend to ∞ with probability zero (see [7] , Theorem VII.5.1 and its corollary). Therefore, (3) happens with probability zero.
The proof shows that Proposition 4 remains true for the restricted game ({0, 1}, [0, 1], ℓ), ℓ(ω, γ) := |ω − γ|.
Reductions between Jeffreys theorems
It appears that the main factor that determines which Jeffreys theorems hold for a particular game of prediction is the degree of convexity of the game. We might define a game to be convex if its prediction set Γ is a convex set in a linear space and its loss function ℓ(ω, γ) is convex in γ ∈ Γ. However, this definition would be too narrow, since the predictions γ are usually just arbitrary labels. We start from introducing a much less arbitrary representation of games of prediction.
A canonical prediction is a function λ : Ω → R such that
The canonical representation of the game (Ω, Γ, ℓ) is the pair (Ω, Λ) where Λ, called the canonical prediction set, is the set of all canonical predictions. We will not always distinguish between the game and its canonical representation and will usually consider games that are non-redundant in the sense that
A superprediction (resp. subprediction) is a function λ :
The set of all superpredictions (resp. subpredictions) will be denoted Λ (resp. Λ) and called the superprediction set (resp. subprediction set ).
We will be interested in three notions of convexity for games of prediction:
• a game is convex if its superprediction set Λ is convex (equivalently, if a convex mixture of two canonical predictions is always a superprediction); this condition is always satisfied if Γ is a convex set and the loss function ℓ(ω, γ) is convex in γ ∈ Γ;
• a game is strictly convex if a non-degenerate convex mixture of two canonical predictions is always an interior point of Λ (in the topology of uniform convergence);
• a game is perfectly mixable if, for some η > 0, the set e −ηΛ is convex.
For illustrative purposes it is convenient to consider the case where the game (Ω, Γ, ℓ) is binary, in the sense Ω = {0, 1}. In this case Λ can be represented as the subset of R 2 consisting of the points (x, y) = (λ(0), λ(1)) where λ ranges over Λ. An example is given as the curved line in Figure 1 below; the superpredictions are the points North-East of the line, and the subpredictions are the points South-West of the line.
It is easy to see that for perfectly mixable prediction games there is no real difference between the three levels of Jeffreys theorems:
Proposition 5. Suppose Sceptic can guarantee (1) in the competitive prediction protocol for a perfectly mixable game. Then he can also guarantee (3) (and, a fortiori, (2)).
Proof. Consider the generalization of the competitive prediction protocol in which there are infinitely many Predictors (called Experts and numbered by k = 1, 2, . . .) instead of just two. Using the Aggregating Algorithm (see, e.g., [10] , Subsection 2.1), for any sequence p 1 , p 2 , . . . of positive weights summing to 1 Sceptic can guarantee that his loss satisfies
for all N = 1, 2, . . . and k = 1, 2, . . ., where C is a constant depending on the prediction game. Let Sceptic play a strategy that guarantees (1). We will construct a new strategy for Sceptic that guarantees (3). Consider the following doubly infinite set of experts:
• Expert (k, 1), k = 1, 2, . . ., plays as Sceptic until the difference L [1] n −L n exceeds 2 k ; as soon as this happens (if it ever happens), he starts playing as Predictor 1;
• Expert (k, 2) plays as Sceptic until the difference L [2] n −L n exceeds 2 k ; as soon as this happens, he starts playing as Predictor 2.
The weights p k,1 and p k,2 assigned to these experts are p k,1 = p k,2 = 2 −k−1 . Applied to these experts, the Aggregating Algorithm provides a new strategy for Sceptic that guarantees (3). Indeed, suppose the first of the three terms in (3) is false. Then, by (1), either the second or the third term in (3) becomes true when lim is replaced by lim sup. Suppose, for concreteness, it is the second term. For each k, Expert (k, 1)'s loss satisfies L
k from some N on, and so (5) implies that the Aggregating Algorithm's loss L N satisfies
for all k and from some N on. Letting k → ∞, we can see that the second term of (3), with L N in place ofL N , is true.
Of course, Proposition 5 will continue to hold if the Euclidean distance in (1), (2) , and (3) is replaced by any other distance.
Examples of perfectly mixable games
The bounded square-loss game is perfectly mixable ([10], Subsection 2.4).
Perhaps the most fundamental class of games of prediction is that of logloss games. If (Ω, Γ, ℓ) is a log-loss game, Ω is a measurable space with a fixed σ-finite measure µ (more generally, µ = µ n may depend on n and be announced by a player, say Nature, at the beginning of step n of the game), Γ is the set of all measurable functions γ : Ω → [0, ∞) satisfying γdµ = 1, and ℓ(ω, γ) = − ln γ(ω). For log-loss games the loss function is allowed to take value ∞ (− ln 0 := ∞). A simple and instructive special case to keep in mind is where µ is the counting measure on a countable Ω. The perfect mixability of log-loss games is a well-known fact, and the Aggregating Algorithm for them reduces to the Bayes rule (for details see, e.g., [10] , Subsection 2.2).
For other examples of perfectly mixable games (such as the Kullback-Leibler game and Cover's game), see [10] , Subsection 2.5.
Level 2 Jeffreys theorems
If λ 1 and λ 2 are canonical predictions and α ∈ (−1, 1), we set
(the lower α-divergence between λ 1 and λ 2 ) and
(the upper α-divergence between λ 1 and λ 2 ). The lower and upper divergence make take values −∞ or ∞. We will be mostly interested in lower divergences (which for many interesting games coincides with upper divergences). In the case of binary (Ω, Γ, ℓ) this definition is illustrated in Figure 1 (notice that the difference between lower and upper α-divergences disappears for convex binary games; in such cases, we will sometimes write D Notice that, for strictly convex and non-redundant (in the sense of (4)) games,
for all λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ Λ. For α = 0 the lower (resp. upper) α-divergence is called the lower (resp. upper ) Hellinger distance; the word "distance" is partly explained by its symmetry (although simplest examples show that there is no continuous
) is a metric for every strictly convex game). The values of lower and upper α-divergences for α = ±1 are defined as their limits as α → ±1 when those limits exist. The lower (resp. upper) −1-divergence is called the lower (resp. upper ) Kullback-Leibler divergence and is especially important.
Remark. It is not difficult to see that upper divergences can be very different from the corresponding lower divergences even for "nice" (in particular, strictly convex) games. 
The square-loss and log-loss games
In this subsections we will compute lower and upper divergences for two popular games of prediction defined earlier.
Lemma 1.
In the square-loss game,
for all α ∈ [−1, 1] and γ 1 , γ 2 ∈ R.
Proof. It suffices to consider the case α ∈ (−1, 1). The statement of the lemma will follow from the fact that, for all ω ∈ R,
If we set t 1 := γ 1 − ω and t 2 := γ 2 − ω, the last equality simplifies to the obvious
Lemma 2. In any log-loss game,
for all α ∈ (−1, 1) and γ 1 , γ 2 ∈ Γ.
Proof. The left-hand side of (8) can be written as 4 1−α 2 t where t is defined from the condition that, for some γ ∈ Γ and all ω ∈ Ω,
Deducing
substituting 1 for γdµ, and solving the resulting equation for t, we obtain the statement of the lemma.
The standard definition of the α-divergence for the log-loss game (see, e.g.,
it is clear that this will differ little from (8) when γ 1 and γ 2 are close in a suitable sense. The inequality ln
.
Level 2 and level 3 Jeffreys theorems

This is our most general level 2 Jeffreys theorem:
Proposition 6. For each α ∈ (−1, 1) and ǫ > 0 Sceptic has a strategy that guarantees
Proof. The strategy is obvious: according to (6), at step n Sceptic can choose a canonical prediction λ satisfying
(λ 1 and λ 2 being the canonical predictions corresponding to γ [1] n and γ [2] n ). Summing over the first N steps, we obtain (9). Specializing (9) to the case α = 0 and the square-loss game gives
This implies a stronger version of the level 2 Jeffreys theorem (2):
In combination with the proof of Proposition 5, this implies the stronger form
N −L N = ∞ (10) of the level 3 Jeffreys theorem (3) for the bounded square-loss game.
For the log-loss game, we obtain (10) with the Hellinger distance
n ), or the standard Hellinger distance
n ), in place of (γ [1] n − γ [2] n ) 2 .
Level 1 Jeffreys theorems
The main goal of this section is to prove Proposition 1. In the absolute-loss game, the divergence between any two predictions is 0, and so the methods of the previous section are not applicable. First we describe a strategy for Sceptic that will later be shown to ensure (1). Let f : [0, ∞) → [0, 1/2) be a strictly increasing and concave function satisfying f (0) = 0 and f (∞) < 1/2; see Figure 2 . Later it will be convenient to extend f to (−∞, ∞) by the central symmetry w.r. to the origin O (so that f : (−∞, ∞) → (−1/2, 1/2) is an odd function).
Suppose just before step n = 1, 2, . . . of the competitive prediction protocol we have
n−1 ≥ 0 (the case where L [1] n−1 ≤ L [2] n−1 will later be reduced to this one). Sceptic's move can be represented as
n , where t n will be chosen later from the interval [0, 1/2]. Set If the actual outcome ω n is in favour of Predictor 1,
n between the losses of the two Predictors will decrease to D n = D n−1 − d n and the differenceL n −L n will increase by
So in fact it will decrease as t n ≤ 1/2. Let us set t n := 1/2 − f (D n−1 ). The differenceL n −L n will decrease by the area of the rectangle P 3 P 5 P 4 P 1 . If the actual outcome ω n is in favour of Predictor 2,
the difference between the losses of the two Predictors will increase to D n = D n−1 + d n and the differenceL n −L n will increase by
i.e., by the area of the rectangle P 5 P 8 P 7 P 4 . We can see that in both cases, D n = D n−1 ± d n , the differenceL n −L n increases by Dn Dn−1 f minus the area A n of a curvilinear triangle ( 
and so L 
A n ≤ L A n , and so L 
Convex games
It is easy to see that the proof of Proposition 1 is applicable to any convex game. For any such game Sceptic has a strategy in the competitive prediction protocol that guarantees
